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THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, 
THE MORE THEY 
STAY THE SAME 
Neal Devins† 
 GET IT. The 2008 elections were about change. Real change. 
Change we can believe in. And, most definitely, change from 
the failed presidency of George W. Bush. 
The sad truth is that the most basic questions of how the 
Bush White House understood and exercised presidential power 
played next to no role in the 2008 elections. “What almost no one 
disputes,” wrote Adam Liptak in The New York Times, “is that a cen-
tral legacy of the Bush presidency will be its distinctively muscular 
vision of executive power.”1 This legacy, however, did not mean-
ingfully figure into the 2008 presidential campaign. While Barack 
Obama and John McCain differed sharply on how they would exer-
cise presidential power, the question of how much power presi-
dents should have simply played no role in this election. 
An even sadder truth is that fundamental questions about the 
American system of checks and balances are hardly ever at play in 
presidential elections. Voters, presidential candidates, and political 
parties focus on first order policy preferences, not abstract ques-
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tions about the division of power. The only time that candidates or 
parties will talk about structural questions is to provide rhetorical 
cover to underlying policy preferences. 
And while none of this is surprising, I think it useful to spend a 
few pages talking about why truly fundamental questions about our 
governmental system are unlikely to figure into presidential elec-
tions. In particular, the Bush presidency is a casebook example of 
why it is that voters and lawmakers are unlikely to check presiden-
tial unilateralism. My argument will be divided into four parts. 
First, I will discuss the Bush presidency – both the preeminence of 
presidential power claims to Bush’s legacy and the debate among 
scholars and political columnists about whether Bush’s assertive 
view of presidential power would boomerang and limit presidential 
power in the future. Second, I will look at the 2008 elections, fo-
cusing on the limited saliency of the presidential power issue. 
Third, I will explain why voters and candidates have little interest in 
abstract questions about the balance of powers. Among other 
things, I will talk about the 1976 presidential election between Ger-
ald Ford and Jimmy Carter – where, notwithstanding Watergate, 
the issue of presidential power received next to no play. Fourth, I 
will wrap things up by talking about the implications of all this – 
tying together voter lack of interest in structural questions with the 
rise of presidential unilateralism. 
GEORGE W. BUSH & THE 
SCOPE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
xpansive claims of inherent presidential power played a figura-
tive role in the Bush White House. To cite a few well-known 
examples: the assertion of the power to indefinitely detain so-called 
enemy combatants, the establishment of a military tribunal system 
without formal congressional approval, the warrantless wiretapping 
of U.S. citizens, the robust use of executive privilege, and the ex-
pansive use of presidential signing statements to direct agency poli-
cymaking – including agency non-enforcement of laws that the 
president deems unconstitutional. 
Without question, this push for expansive presidential power has 
E 
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been the source of most academic and popular commentary on the 
administration. Just think of the titles of some recent books about 
the Bush campaign for presidential power: Takeover: The Return of the 
Imperial Presidency & the Subversion of American Democracy, Unchecked 
and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror, and The Terror 
Presidency: Law & Judgment Inside the Bush Administration. Some, most 
notably legal scholars Jack Goldsmith (who served as the head of the 
Office of Legal Counsel under Bush) and John McGinnis (a Reagan-
era veteran of the Office of Legal Counsel), argue that the Bush ad-
ministration weakened the presidency. This argument focuses on 
the tie-in between Bush administration defeats before the Supreme 
Court in war on terror cases and the administration’s failure to seek 
Congressional approval for some of its initiatives. Goldsmith, for 
example, said that the administration’s unnecessarily broad “go it 
alone” view of executive power was intended “to leave the presi-
dency stronger . . . but the approach they took achieved exactly the 
opposite effect.”2 In sharp contrast, journalists like Charlie Savage 
and Emily Bazelon have argued that “presidential power once ac-
crued generally sticks” and that “the expansive presidential powers 
claimed and exercised by the Bush-Cheney White House are now 
an immutable part of American history.”3 
Whatever one thinks of the Bush presidency, one cannot escape 
the fact that the White House’s view of presidential power was 
hugely visible, hugely consequential, and absolutely central both to 
the administration’s policy agenda and to the manner in which it 
interfaced with other parts of government and the American peo-
ple. And with sharp disagreement over the long-term consequences 
of Bush’s embrace of presidential unilateralism, there was good rea-
son to think that the issue of presidential power would figure into 
the 2008 presidential elections. Think again. 
                                                                                                
2 Quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at 
Sunday Magazine 40. Goldsmith’s thinking is fully detailed in his book The Terror 
Presidency (2007). See also John O. McGinnis, Executive Power in the War on Terror, 
146 POLICY REVIEW 63 (Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008). 
3 Emily Bazelon, All the President’s Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at Book 
Review 18; Charlie Savage, TAKEOVER 332 (2007). 
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PRESIDENTIAL POWER & THE 2008 ELECTIONS 
he appropriate scope of presidential power played no meaning-
ful role in the 2008 presidential race. The campaign, instead, 
focused on first order policy priorities, most notably the economy, 
Iraq, and energy. And while both John McCain and Barack Obama 
spent considerable time talking about the failings of the Bush White 
House, that time was not spent answering the question of whether 
Bush either had or sought too much power. Rather, McCain and 
Obama spoke about how they would exercise presidential power 
and how it was that they would bring change to Washington. 
I do not mean to suggest here that Barack Obama or John 
McCain said nothing at all about the scope of presidential power. 
They did. But their comments were limited and, more significant, 
seem little more than an effort to wrap policy preferences in high-
sounding rhetoric. Indeed, dramatic differences in the positions and 
rhetoric of McCain and Obama highlight the fact that neither cam-
paign felt voter pressure to formally embrace a particular view of 
presidential power. Unlike the Bush presidency (where voter sen-
timent clearly demanded that the candidates distance themselves 
from the president and speak about their commitment to change), 
the abstract question of presidential power lacked salience. As such, 
the candidates were free to ignore it – and invoke it simply as part 
of their efforts to distance their policy preferences from the Bush 
White House and from each other. 
Before discussing what candidates McCain and Obama did say 
about presidential power, a few words about press coverage of and 
editorial opinion about this issue. Press coverage, to put it mildly, 
was scant. During the primary season, I could only locate four news 
articles that focused on the presidential power issue. During the 
period after McCain and Obama secured their parties’ nominations 
and up through the party conventions, I could find no news story 
that discussed the issue. And while my research skills may be want-
ing, I think it safe to say that there was next to no press coverage of 
this question.  
Editorial opinion was equally sparse. Aside from a call by the 
Boston Globe to make the “limits of executive power . . . a vital sub-
T 
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ject for the [presidential] debates,” no major newspaper took an 
editorial position on the scope of presidential power issue.4 Indeed, 
I could only locate three op-ed pieces on this topic – two of which 
complained about voter disinterest in the presidential power issue. 
One was written by Bruce Fein, head of the American Freedom 
Agenda – a conservative group which tried to get Republican and 
Democratic candidates to sign a pledge committing “to restore the 
Constitution’s checks and balances” (Ron Paul signed; no other ma-
jor party candidate signed).5 Writing in The Washington Times, Fein 
lamented that the “current political campaigns are blind to what the 
Founding Fathers thought elections should be about,” that is, “se-
curing freedom . . . with a robust system and transparent system of 
checks and balances.”6 Likewise, Dana Nelson wrote in the Los Ange-
les Times that the American people should “begin questioning presi-
dential candidates” about “Bush’s exercise of executive power” and, 
with it, the unitary executive.7 
Journalistic disinterest in this topic is also reflected in the presi-
dential debates. No question was asked about Congress’s role in 
checking presidential power; no question was asked about the scope 
of inherent presidential power. And while the scope of vice-
presidential power came up in the Biden-Palin debate, the McCain-
Obama debates focused exclusively on the exercise of presidential 
power. 
Now on to the campaigns themselves. Let me start with Barack 
Obama. His web page made no mention of the presidential power 
issue, his acceptance speech made no mention of this issue, tran-
scripts of convention remarks made by other key Democrats (in-
cluding Al Gore, Joseph Biden, Bill Clinton, and Hillary Clinton) 
made no mention of the scope of presidential power issue. Com-
                                                                                                
4 Veeps for unfettered power, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2008, at A12. On the question 
of vice-presidential power, The New York Times ran an editorial on October 4, 
2008, Dick Cheney, Role Model. 
5 See Charlie Savage, Disaffected conservatives set a litmus test for ’08: Want vow to curb 
presidential power, BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 2007, at A1. 
6 Bruce Fein, Unaddressed issue, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at A18. 
7 Dana D. Nelson, How powerful a president?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A19. 
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ments by Obama (or a surrogate) about presidential power are few 
and far between. His comments, however, are telling – revealing a 
desire to attack the Bush White House without formally committing 
to a particular view of presidential power. 
Obama, for example, said that he would “turn the page on the 
imperial presidency that treats national security as a partisan issue – 
not an American issue” and that he would consult “every month” 
with a “group of congressional leaders on national security.”8 He 
also signed a pledge disavowing Bush administration policies on 
warrantless wiretapping, torture, and “unchecked [presidential] 
power.”9 He also criticized Bush’s use of signing statements, saying 
that presidents must protect their “constitutional prerogatives” but 
that the “Bush administration had gone much further than that.”10 
And finally, Obama ran on a platform that rejects the “sweeping 
claims of inherent presidential power” made by President Bush and 
calls for the appointment of judges who “respect our system of 
checks and balances.” 
Notwithstanding their high-sounding rhetoric, Obama’s attacks 
on presidential power had nothing to do with the appropriate scope 
of presidential power. These are attacks, pure and simple, on how 
Bush exercised presidential power. Obama did not call for Congress 
to enact reform legislation that would tie the president’s hands. His 
criticisms of signing statements and inherent war powers are criti-
cisms of how Bush made use of these powers. While saying that 
Bush treats the Constitution “like a nuisance” and that “[w]e’ve paid 
a heavy price for having a president whose priority is expanding his 
own power,”11 there is no suggestion that Obama would not use 
signing statements to justify non-enforcement of federal statutes. 
Indeed, Obama claims that he would use signing statements when-
                                                                                                
8 Lynn Sweet, Power-sharing promises, thehill.com, Oct. 4, 2007. 
9 Bob Egelko, Groups on left, right ask candidates to reject Bush’s wider powers, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, Oct. 14, 2007, at A1. 
10 Charlie Savage, Candidates on Executive Power: A Full Spectrum, BOST. GLOBE, Dec. 
22, 2007 at A1 (quoting Obama). 
11 David Nather, Barack Obama: Calling for ‘a New Era of Openness’, CONG. Q. 
WEEKLY, Dec. 17, 2007, at 3712. 
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ever he thinks it necessary to protect his “constitutional preroga-
tives.” Likewise, there is no suggestion that Obama thinks that 
presidents must first obtain congressional approval before commit-
ting the nation’s troops to battle. And his call to regularly meet 
with congressional leaders is no different than what Presidents 
Clinton and Bush did (it is just that Obama promises to do a better 
job listening than did his predecessor). 
At bottom, all Obama is saying is that his policy priorities are 
different than Bush’s and he would exercise power differently than 
Bush. His calls for a more constrained view of inherent power are 
simply a way for him to justify his policy preferences and attack 
Bush on constitutional as well as policy grounds. Along these lines, 
while claiming that Bush abused his powers, the Obama campaign – 
when asked whether “Mr. Bush had personally violated any laws as 
he moved to expand his executive authority” – said it “doesn’t have 
enough information” to assess whether the president did anything 
illegal (and presumably that includes unconstitutionally extending 
the reach of executive power).12 
The Republican campaign followed a similar script, although the 
constitutional rhetoric embraced by John McCain embraced a far 
different set of policy preferences. To start, there were very few 
comments about this issue from either McCain or his backers. 
Likewise, his web page made no mention of the presidential power 
issue. His acceptance speech made no mention of this issue. Tran-
scripts of the remarks made by other key Republicans (including 
President George W. Bush, Sarah Palin, and Rudy Guilliani) made 
no mention of the presidential power issue. The party platform 
made limited reference to presidential power, calling for an expan-
sion in the scope of executive power. In particular, the platform 
embraced the creation of a line item veto, the recognition that the 
president has plenary power over the management of war and de-
ployment of troops, and for Congress (not the president) to operate 
                                                                                                
12 James Risen, The Executive Power Awaiting the Next President, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2008, at Week in Review 4. 
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within its proper, limited scope of power established in the Consti-
tution. 
McCain and his surrogates hardly spoke about presidential 
power but their comments largely tracked the party platform. 
When asked if President Bush had abused his power, the McCain 
campaign responded by speaking generally about the need for “war-
time presidents . . . [to] exert[] their constitutional powers to the 
utmost.”13 Likewise, McCain refused to sign the pledge (that 
Obabma signed) disavowing “unchecked [presidential] power.” On 
the other hand, McCain criticized several Bush administration initia-
tives, most notably warrantless wiretapping and the contemplated 
use of torture. He also disavowed the Bush administration’s use of 
signing statements – claiming that “I don’t think the president has 
the right to disobey any law.”14 
As was true with the Democratic platform, those appeals to con-
stitutional principle were little more than a way to package policy 
preferences in high-sounding rhetoric. On national security, 
McCain simultaneously distanced himself from Bush (on wiretap-
ping and torture) while placing no limits on the scope of his war 
making powers. And while he claimed that presidents must obey 
the law, there was little question that a President McCain would 
make use of pre-enforcement directives and other techniques to see 
to it that agencies adhered to McCain’s policy preferences. 
That presidential candidates would place few limits on the scope 
of their powers is to be expected. Presidents gain little by placing 
formal constraints on how they exercise power. In other words, 
presidents will not run against presidential power unless there is an 
identity of interests between a president’s policy preferences and 
some constitutional limit on the exercise of presidential power. 
This phenomenon is longstanding. The balance of power issue is a 
non-starter for presidential candidates. In other words, unless and 
until voters make presidential power a defining campaign issue, the 
focus of presidential elections will be first order policy preferences 
                                                                                                
13 Id. 
14 Savage, supra note 10 (quoting McCain). 
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– not the seemingly abstract question of how power is divided 
within the federal government and between the states and federal 
government. For reasons I will now detail, voters have little inter-
est in structural issues and, consequently, elections never turn on a 
candidate’s position on the balance of powers. 
WHY VOTERS & CANDIDATES DO NOT WANT 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO BE AN ELECTION ISSUE 
he 2008 elections typify a longstanding pattern – voters have 
no interest in structural questions; presidential candidates have 
no interest in running against presidential power. The fact that 
presidential power was the centerpiece of the Bush presidency did 
not matter. The fact that the rhetoric of the 2008 elections was tied 
to the widespread belief that the Bush White House failed America 
did not matter. Plain and simple: If checks and balances did not 
matter in 2008, it seems unlikely that the scope of presidential 
power will ever loom large in presidential races.  
Here are two more data points that back up this claim: the 1976 
presidential race between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford; and the 
1951 ratification of the 22nd amendment (limiting a president to 
two terms in office). In critical respects, presidential overreaching 
cast a shadow over both the 1976 race (Richard Nixon’s abuse of 
power) and the 22nd amendment (Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
stranglehold on the presidency through four election cycles). At the 
same time, just as George W. Bush’s strong claims of presidential 
power proved a non-issue in 2008, the abstract question of presi-
dential power did not captivate voter interest in either the 1976 
presidential race or the 22nd amendment ratification fight. 
The 1976 election. Traditional issues – employment, taxation, 
and inflation – dominated the campaign. And while Watergate 
lurked in the background, the focal point here was “an elusive 
something called ‘trust.’”15 Jimmy Carter spoke of the Nixon-Ford 
                                                                                                
15 Joseph Lelyveld, The Soft-Sell Presidential Commercials: So Far, Carter and Ford Have 
Pushed the ‘Trust’ Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1976, at Week in Review 4. See also 
Gerald M. Pomper, The Presidential Election, in THE ELECTION OF 1976: REPORTS 
T 
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administration and promised the American people that he “would 
not lie to [them];” Gerald Ford, while speaking of his life as “an 
American ethic, an obligation to serve,” could not escape the shack-
les of his Nixon pardon.16 Voters and candidates paid no attention 
to the scope of presidential power. The fact that Nixon acted “im-
perial[ly]” by claiming “broad, virtually unchecked authority to con-
duct military operations” and had “moved aggressively to assert 
presidential powers to impound appropriated funds [and] to pocket 
veto legislation” did not matter.17 And it did not matter that the 
Watergate-era Congress set about to limit presidential prerogatives 
through the enactment of landmark legislation constraining presi-
dential prerogatives over war-making, the budget, and much more. 
All that mattered was how the president would use his power. For 
this very reason, Carter ran against the Nixon legacy by simultane-
ously pushing for an increase in presidential power and a commit-
ment to using that power to be a “citizen president” who would 
fight special interests and “restore efficiency, competence, and vir-
tue to the federal government.”18 
The 22nd amendment is an even clearer example of voter inter-
est in first order policy priorities, not structural questions about the 
scope of presidential power.19 In both 1940 and 1944, the Republi-
can Party platform sought to derail Roosevelt’s re-election bids by 
calling for a constitutional amendment to limit the president to two 
terms. Campaign literature in 1940, for example, compared Roo-
sevelt to the Axis-power leaders and “railed against the dangers of 
allowing a President to serve as a would-be-dictator.”20 When the 
                                                                                                
& INTERPRETATIONS 37 (Marlene M. Pomper, ed., 1977). 
16 Kathleen Hall Jameson, PACKAGING THE PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY & CRITICISM OF 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING 357 (3d ed. 1996). 
17 Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the 
Reagan Era, 57 G.W. L. REV. 401, 408 (1989). 
18 Lloyd F. Bitzer & Theodore Rueter, CARTER VS. FORD: THE COUNTERFEIT 
DEBATES OF 1976 at 189 (1980). 
19 This paragraph is drawn from Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make the Consti-
tution More Democratic?, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 971, 990-92 (2007). 
20 Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice & Future President: Constitutional 
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Republicans took over Congress in 1946, they saw passage of the 
amendment as a way to strengthen their power by discrediting the 
policies of Roosevelt and then-President Harry Truman. At that 
time, however, the presidential tenure issue held little interest for 
voters and the press. “There was only spotty coverage in the local 
press, virtually none in national periodicals, and little public par-
ticipation. Even interest groups . . . paid little attention.”21 The rea-
son: Without knowing who sits in the White House and in Con-
gress, voters and interest groups could not predict whether the 
amendment would prove useful or harmful to favored policies. In 
contrast, there was widespread interest in the third term issue dur-
ing the 1940 election campaign. That concern, of course, was tied 
to the outcome of the election. Stated differently, voters will pay 
scant attention to structural reform proposals unless those proposals 
are directly linked to policy questions that they care about. 
Voter disinterest in structural questions is not at all surprising. 
“Executive power is such an abstract subject that it rarely, if ever, 
comes up during a presidential campaign. It’s hard to pose the ques-
tions in a way that matters to voters.”22 This is a by-product of two 
phenomena. First, structural issues simply do not engage the “pas-
sions of citizens;” voters care about “underlying public policy issues 
like drugs and education.”23 Second, voters cannot predict whether 
their underlying policy preferences are better served by shifting 
power to or away from the president. Republicans pushed for the 
22nd amendment to advance their policy agenda; Republicans 
called for the repeal of the 22nd amendment to cement policy gains 
made during the so-called Reagan Revolution.  
Something else is also in play, namely, voters are generally igno-
rant about political matters and especially ignorant about issues that 
                                                                                                
Interstices & the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 586 (1999). 
21 Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical Remedy or Partisan 
Maneuver, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 67, 71 (1990). 
22 David Nather, New Handshake, Same Grip, CONG. Q. WEEKLY, Dec. 16, 2007, at 
3702. 
23 John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial 
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 96 (2004). 
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involve complex issues involving the balance of power between dif-
ferent governmental units. “[T]he low level of political knowledge 
among American citizens is one of the best-established findings in all 
social science.”24 Voters, instead, care about things that matter to 
them – family, work, popular culture. For most Americans, the 
costs of becoming fluent in policy issues far outweigh the benefits of 
acquiring political knowledge. After all, a single vote is not likely to 
shape policy outcomes. On structural questions, political ignorance 
is at its most extreme. Not only are these issues complex and ab-
stract, there is no obvious tie-in between preferred policy prefer-
ences and the division of power among governmental units. Take 
abortion. Pro-choice voters preferred presidential power when Bill 
Clinton faced a Republican Congress (Clinton’s repeal of Reagan 
era regulations and his veto of partial birth legislation) and pre-
ferred congressional power when Ronald Reagan faced a Democ-
ratic Congress (the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork). 
One final example: the 1994 Contract with America. Reflecting 
widespread public dissatisfaction with Congress, opinion polls re-
vealed that Americans thought that the federal government was not 
trustworthy, that members of Congress cared more about making 
themselves look good than making the country better, and that 
people elected to Congress quickly lost touch with the people. Re-
sponding to these populist signals, Newt Gingrich and other Repub-
lican leaders in the House concocted the Contract as a symbol of 
change that would resonate with voters. The Contract advanced 
Republican policy priorities by calling for devolving power to the 
states both by eliminating unfunded mandates and by making use of 
block grants that would give the states more discretion over the 
expenditure of federal funds.25 Embraced by Republican leaders as a 
symbol that would propel them to victory in 1994 congressional 
races, voters and candidates alike paid little mind to the Contract. 
                                                                                                
24 Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance & the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective 
on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1371 
(2004). 
25 See Somin & Devins, 55 DRAKE L. REV. at 988-89. 
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Reflecting the fact that structural issues do not resonate with voters 
and thus should not be a centerpiece of any campaign, few Republi-
can candidates mentioned the Contract in their advertisements. 
More telling, a poll taken “one week before the election found that 
71 percent of voters had never heard of the Contract – and those 
who had were just as likely to support Democrats.”26 
The McCain-Obama campaign follows this script. Balance of 
powers concerns played no role in the election but, on occasion, 
were invoked as rhetorical cover for preferred policy positions. The 
question remains: What are the consequences of electing presidents 
without paying attention to larger questions implicating the balance 
of powers among governmental units?  
PRESIDENTIAL UNILATERALISM AFTER BUSH27 
he consequences of voter disinterest in presidential powers are 
profound. With no meaningful electoral check on presidential 
power, presidents have incentives to advance their favored policy 
preferences – and, if necessary, package those preferences as part 
and parcel of their inherent power. Indeed, presidents inevitably 
expand the scope of presidential power simply by pursuing favored 
policy initiatives. In particular, presidents have strong incentives to 
act unilaterally rather than pursue the burdensome and oft times 
unsuccessful strategy of seeking legislative authorization. In this 
way, presidents “push out the boundaries of their power” when 
making strategic use of their powers of unilateral action to “gain 
                                                                                                
26 Peter Beinart, Speak Not, NEW REPUB., Sept. 4, 2006, at 6. Had Republican 
candidates made the Contract and, with it, the balance of power between federal 
and state government a centerpiece of their campaign, it is possible that the fed-
eralism issue would have resonated with voters. See Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. 
Mikos, Do Citizens Care About Federalism? An Experimental Test, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LE-
GAL STUDIES 589 (2007). 
27 Portions of this section dealing with presidential and lawmaker incentives are 
drawn from comments I made at the Willamette Law School conference on 
presidential power in the 21st century. Those remarks will soon be published in 
the Willamette Law Review. 
T 
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policy advantage.”28 The rise of executive orders, OMB review of 
proposed agency regulations, and much more is tied to this phe-
nomenon. 
Voter disinterest in the presidential power issue also spills over 
to Congress’s willingness to assert its institutional prerogatives to 
check presidential power. To start, just as voters do not care about 
the scope of presidential power, they do not care about the scope of 
Congressional power. Voter disinterest in the 1994 Contract with 
America is just one example of this phenomenon. More to the 
point, voters and interest group constituents care about first order 
policy priorities, not the scope of power issue. For this very reason, 
the individual and institutional interests of members of Congress are 
often in conflict with one another. Members of Congress regularly 
trade off their interest in Congress as an institution for their per-
sonal interests – most notably, reelection and advancing their (and 
their constituents’) policy agendas. In describing this collective ac-
tion problem, Terry Moe and William Howell speak of lawmakers 
being “trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma: all might benefit if they 
could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, but 
each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local constitu-
ency.”29 
What all this means is that presidents can pursue whatever vi-
sions of presidential power matches their policy agendas. This does 
not mean that presidents will necessarily assert a strong view of in-
herent presidential power. At the same time, with little meaningful 
voter or lawmaker interest in this question, it is not surprising that 
candidates McCain and Obama felt free to embrace competing vi-
sions of presidential power when describing policy preferences.  
Consequently, even though the Supreme Court rejected George 
W. Bush’s claims of broad inherent power over enemy combatants, 
there is no reason to think that these Court rulings will meaning-
fully limit the scope of presidential power. In part, most presiden-
                                                                                                
28 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999). 
29 Id. at. 144. 
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tial powers claims are settled by the political process – so the most 
salient question is whether voters and lawmakers are willing to 
stand up to presidential power. For reasons detailed above, there is 
little reason to think that the electoral process will meaningfully 
check presidential power. More than that, Bush-era judicial defeats 
are time bound – repudiating a particular policy initiative but not 
limiting presidential power. Under this account, Supreme Court 
enemy combatant rulings will not necessarily spill over to foreclose 
presidential initiatives on other domestic or national security mat-
ters. While de-legitimating certain claims of presidential power 
during the Bush years, these rulings did not diminish presidential 
power in some fundamental way. Presidents will continue both to 
articulate a broad vision of inherent presidential power and pursue 
unilateral policy initiatives. The question of whether a president 
will go it alone or seek framework legislation from Congress is, 
ultimately, a question about policy preferences. The Bush admini-
stration had a policy preference to advance favored policies through 
unilateral exercises of presidential power. President Obama may 
make more strategic use of unilateral decision making – going it 
alone when lawmakers will not back him up; going to Congress 
when lawmaker support improves his chances of successfully ad-
vancing his policy agenda in court. 
Time will tell whether the above claims are correct. But if the 
past is prologue, I think my argument is a winner. Barack Obama 
and John McCain did not engage in the presidential power issue 
because voters did not care. And voters – at least since the New 
Deal – have never cared about this question. Ditto members of 
Congress – who have no reason to focus on constitutional abstrac-
tions when their constituents focus on first order policy priorities. 
Given presidential incentives to expand power, there is simply no 
reason for President Obama to see Bush’s legal defeats as a weight 
on his efforts to pursue his favored policy agenda. 
 
 
 
 
